Robustness of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma in complex networks
J. Poncela, J. Gómez-Gardeñes, L.M. Floría, Y. MorenoNEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS 9, 184 (2007)
Times cited: 94
Abstract
Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner’s
dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the
heterogeneity of
the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of
cooperation. In
this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the
asymptotic states
of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of
cooperators.
We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the set of
nodes
where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of initial
conditions, in
contrast with the behavior of both the set of nodes where defection is
fixed, and
the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results
when
varying the degree heterogeneity along a one-parametric family of
networks
interpolating between the class of Erdos–Renyi graphs and the
Barabási–Albert
networks.