Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma in random scale-free graphs
J. Poncela, J. Gómez-Gardeñes, Y. Moreno, L.M. FloríaINT. JOURNAL OF BIFURCATION & CHAOS 20, 849 (2010)
Times cited: 11
Abstract
We study the cooperative behavior of agents playing the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game in
random scale-free networks.We show that the survival of cooperation is
enhanced with respect to
random homogeneous graphs but, on the other hand, decreases when
compared to that found in
Barab´asi–Albert scale-free networks.We show that the latter decrease
is related to the structure
of cooperation. Additionally, we present a mean field approximation for
studying evolutionary
dynamics in networks with no degree-degree correlations and with
arbitrary degree distribution.
The mean field approach is similar to the one used for describing the
disease spreading in complex
networks, making a further compartmentalization of the strategists
partition into degree-classes.
We show that this kind of approximation is suitable to describe the
behavior of the system for
a particular set of initial conditions, such as the placement of
cooperators in the higher-degree
classes, while it fails to reproduce the level of cooperation observed
in the numerical simulations
for arbitrary initial configurations.