Coordination and growth: The Stag Hunt game on evolutionary networks.
Michele Starnini, Angel Sánchez, Julia Poncela, Yamir MorenoJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment P05008 , P05008 (2011)
Times cited: 4
Abstract
Recently, the study of evolutionary games on networks has attracted a
great interest, focusing mainly on the problem of the emergence of
cooperation. A well
studied framework for this problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on
?xed, evolving
or growing networks. In this paper we present a complete picture of the
behavior
of another important social dilemma, the Stag Hunt game, under an
evolutionary
preferential attachment model, in which the network grows according to
the dynamical
states of the elements of the system. We observe the emergence of a
scale-free
and hierarchical organization of the strategies according to
connectivity classes as
a by-product of the di?usion of cooperation in the network. Depending on
the
parametrization of the game dynamics, we ?nd a smooth transition from
cooperation
to defection and a polymorphic state with simultaneous presence of
cooperator and
defector hubs, very unusual in coordination games.